Eli5: how did America actually destabilize the Middle East in the Iraq war? What was done specifically that caused all of the chaos in the countries we were involved in?
In: 185
In March 2003 the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Poland went to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Due to Western military strength the Iraqi army was quickly defeated, with many Iraqi fighters choosing to go home with their guns once it was clear that Iraq would be defeated. President Bush [announced](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mission_Accomplished_speech) *Mission Accomplished* by May 1st 2003.
One thing the United States [had not planned for very carefully was the time after Saddam](https://news.mit.edu/2023/3-questions-iraq-invasion-20-years-later-0320). It was expected that after liberation power would be given to Iraqis in a democratic political system and the oil wealth in Iraq would get the economy up and running. Seemed simple enough.
However, the collapse of the Iraqi army and Hussein’s regime meant that there was a power vacuum in Iraq. Before Western troops could take full control everywhere, this caused [widespread lootings, including of many Iraqi stockpiles of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)](https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2023/iraq-invasion-20-years-sipri-data). On top of this, the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by Paul Bremer, decided to go for [de-Ba’athification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De-Ba%27athification) of the government and public sector, as well as disbanding the remains of the Iraqi army. This meant that anyone who had been in government or public sector during Hussein’s time was permanently excluded from working there again and that many people with military training found themselves without jobs.
One other aspect of the Iraq war was that especially neoconservatives had thought that a short occupation of Iraq could be done with few troops necessary. American army planners had estimated that [some 250,000 troops would be the absolute minimum and experiences with successful counter-insurgencies suggested even double that amount](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/05/09/a-proven-formula-for-how-many-troops-we-need/5c6dbfc9-33f8-4648-bd07-40d244a1daa4/), although the [precise ratio of troops-to-civilians for enough order and security has been debated](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31946/07-02%20Troop_Levels_Stability_Operations.pdf). Regardless, the Western coalition fielded [between 120,000 and 180,000 troops in total during the years 2003 to 2009](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War_troop_surge_of_2007#/media/File:Iraq_Troop_Strength.svg), with alternating surges and withdrawals. Most of these troops were American. While they thought that they would be hailed as liberators, they found themselves increasingly in battle with armed insurgents of various militias, who used asymmetrical warfare tactics in urban areas and made use of IEDs, suicide and mortar attacks against coalition and pro-Western Iraqi forces. [Plenty of Iraqi civilians died](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War) during these fights between militias, Iraqi government forces and Western forces. This led to new waves of insecurity and people fleeing. Others sought refuge among one of the many local militias.
One promise was the installation of democracy and in 2005 elections were indeed held. The main problem here was that Iraq was [divided along ethno-religious lines](https://www.cfr.org/article/twenty-years-after-war-oust-saddam-iraq-shaky-democracy) and this was reinforced by the electoral process. About 60% of the population was Shia Arab, about a fifth was Sunni Arab and another fifth Sunni Kurdish and then a multitude of ethnic and religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis. Saddam Hussein and his tribe were Sunni Arabs and most of government officials and military officers had been Sunni Arabs. De-Ba’athification and disbanding the Iraqi army had disproportionately hit them and their response created an armed insurgency in Western Iraq. Demographic calculations made it likely that they would be permanently excluded from power in regular elections, so they were not very invested in Iraqi democracy.
Similarly, the Kurds in the north also had reasons to move away from the Iraqi state and would rather establish self-rule, especially over the northern territories with plenty of oil fields and their revenue. The Shia in the south were more amenable to majority rule, but felt that the Westerners had overstayed their welcome. A terror campaign perpetrated by Al Qaeda-in-Iraq, which had now found its way there, targeted amongst others the Golden Mosque in Samarra in 2006, which was an important place for Shias. This reinforced sectarian violence and led cities like Baghdad to segregate along ethno-religious lines, while it experienced many suicide bombings and other violence. Other countries and entities, notably Shia Iran and Hezbollah, gave weapons and training to support certain Shia militias.
Eventually, the number of attacks slowly decreased, also by making strategic deals in buying the support of certain militias. Some militias were officially incorporated by government forces, though their loyalty was always questionable. Which was a big reason for government forces to simply fall back when ISIS crossed into Iraq from Syria in 2014.
Finally, although the Iraqi state earned a lot of money by selling oil again, this was mostly [for the benefit of those who had access to a kleptocratic government](https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf). Many Iraqis experienced severe [economic hardship and un- or undereployment](https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf). In this sense economic conditions under democracy were not much better than during Hussein’s Iraq, when Western economic sanctions had crippled the Iraqi economy and had led to widespread deprivation, high infant mortality and lack of (maternal) healthcare.
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