how nuclear inspectors can inspect other countries nuclear weapon inventories and uranium refining abilities in a way that can be trusted and not just staged by the inspected country
In: 1404
What about the product? Are Geiger Vounters or their equivalent, TLD, etc., used to locate it to determine whether it is for weapons or not?
What about the product? Are Geiger Vounters or their equivalent, TLD, etc., used to locate it to determine whether it is for weapons or not?
Once a facility is built, the IAEA installs a variety of tools to track movements of radioactive materials within facilities which allows them to determine very precisely what is being done with the material. How much in, how much out, how fast, etc is all tracked using an array of sealed detectors and cameras. Data is collected and remotely accessed via tamper evident cabinets. Tamper evident cameras are also placed in key functional areas in the facility that would capture any nefarious activities. Once the monitoring equipment is in place it is basically impossible to use the facility in any way other than intended without them noticing. IAEA primarily relies on tamper *evident* methods as it is not their role to enforce compliance – just to analyze and identify.
Once a facility is built, the IAEA installs a variety of tools to track movements of radioactive materials within facilities which allows them to determine very precisely what is being done with the material. How much in, how much out, how fast, etc is all tracked using an array of sealed detectors and cameras. Data is collected and remotely accessed via tamper evident cabinets. Tamper evident cameras are also placed in key functional areas in the facility that would capture any nefarious activities. Once the monitoring equipment is in place it is basically impossible to use the facility in any way other than intended without them noticing. IAEA primarily relies on tamper *evident* methods as it is not their role to enforce compliance – just to analyze and identify.
Very simplified: Nuclear weapons are not something you keep as a surprise. You WANT other countries to know you have them.
Nuclear weapons are also very expensive to build and keep around considering you really don’t want to ever use them.
So having more nukes than other countries think you have is needlessly expensive and having fewer nukes than they think you have is risky if they ever do try and test you.
This is why mutual inspections are a great deal for both sides and you have very little reason to deceive each other.
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As an aside since this is likely motivated by Russia suspending the New START agreement. This is entirely a posturing move by Russia. The deal that was in place already allowed for waaaaaay more nukes than Russia or the US would ever need in an all out war with each other. Building even more than that would be a really dumb waste of money and nothing more. This is Russia saying “We can build more nukes now” and the appropriate response to this is: “Sure! Knock yourself out!”
Very simplified: Nuclear weapons are not something you keep as a surprise. You WANT other countries to know you have them.
Nuclear weapons are also very expensive to build and keep around considering you really don’t want to ever use them.
So having more nukes than other countries think you have is needlessly expensive and having fewer nukes than they think you have is risky if they ever do try and test you.
This is why mutual inspections are a great deal for both sides and you have very little reason to deceive each other.
—
As an aside since this is likely motivated by Russia suspending the New START agreement. This is entirely a posturing move by Russia. The deal that was in place already allowed for waaaaaay more nukes than Russia or the US would ever need in an all out war with each other. Building even more than that would be a really dumb waste of money and nothing more. This is Russia saying “We can build more nukes now” and the appropriate response to this is: “Sure! Knock yourself out!”
So it’s a big issue and over the years a lot of tools and techniques were developed to make the detection of “cheating” better. These include not only the “open” tools used by inspectors, but also more “clandestine” tools used by intelligence agencies (like getting people to spy for you, and hacking, and even murder and sabotage at times).
In terms of the “open” tools, the absolutely best ones these days are:
a) Very good aerial intelligence (satellite photos) that let you track, week to week and year to year, activity on the ground. So you can see if some big hole is being dug and whether there is a lot of activity (from cars) at a given site and so on. Trained analysts can do a LOT with this kind of information; it is useful for detecting things that don’t mesh up with official accounts, or looking for suspicious facilities.
b) Inspectors (and spies) can take soil and water samples from places of interest. If you are enriching uranium, for example, it is basically impossible to not have microscopic amounts escaping from your facility. For decades it has been possible to look at these microscopic samples and see what levels of enrichment are present there. If a state tells you they are only enriching to 4% and you find 60% enrichment in the soil around the enrichment building, you know they are lying.
c) For states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA has the right to put cameras inside their facilities, and other “monitors” of that sort. You can sometimes see them in photos of Iran’s centrifuge facilities, for example — they are blue and high up on the wall. Trained analysts can look at footage of people doing stuff and see when it looks different from what they are supposed to be doing (like moving materials places they aren’t supposed to be). Now, this requires both the state to be a member of the treaty and to declare the facility to the IAEA. So you still need a) and b) above to make sure that you’ve identified all of the right facilities. And you need them to be a member of the NPT in the first place.
Israel (not an NPT member) famously hid the secret parts of its nuclear facility from US visitors by literally bricking up the door to the elevator when they came to visit in the 1960s. But this was the sort of formative experience that led to the development of the above techniques.
So it’s a big issue and over the years a lot of tools and techniques were developed to make the detection of “cheating” better. These include not only the “open” tools used by inspectors, but also more “clandestine” tools used by intelligence agencies (like getting people to spy for you, and hacking, and even murder and sabotage at times).
In terms of the “open” tools, the absolutely best ones these days are:
a) Very good aerial intelligence (satellite photos) that let you track, week to week and year to year, activity on the ground. So you can see if some big hole is being dug and whether there is a lot of activity (from cars) at a given site and so on. Trained analysts can do a LOT with this kind of information; it is useful for detecting things that don’t mesh up with official accounts, or looking for suspicious facilities.
b) Inspectors (and spies) can take soil and water samples from places of interest. If you are enriching uranium, for example, it is basically impossible to not have microscopic amounts escaping from your facility. For decades it has been possible to look at these microscopic samples and see what levels of enrichment are present there. If a state tells you they are only enriching to 4% and you find 60% enrichment in the soil around the enrichment building, you know they are lying.
c) For states in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA has the right to put cameras inside their facilities, and other “monitors” of that sort. You can sometimes see them in photos of Iran’s centrifuge facilities, for example — they are blue and high up on the wall. Trained analysts can look at footage of people doing stuff and see when it looks different from what they are supposed to be doing (like moving materials places they aren’t supposed to be). Now, this requires both the state to be a member of the treaty and to declare the facility to the IAEA. So you still need a) and b) above to make sure that you’ve identified all of the right facilities. And you need them to be a member of the NPT in the first place.
Israel (not an NPT member) famously hid the secret parts of its nuclear facility from US visitors by literally bricking up the door to the elevator when they came to visit in the 1960s. But this was the sort of formative experience that led to the development of the above techniques.
Enrichment facilities are huge, they use very specialized equipment, and they consume a lot of power. Inspectors use all three of those factors to figure out when a country might be trying to hide weapon production.
First, if you build a factory big enough to house a uranium processing plant, a bunch of satellites are going to see it, so inspectors are going to want to look at it. Second, you’re going to have to buy some really big, really strong gas centrifuges, and those are only really used for one thing. Only a few companies make them, and while it’s fine for a country to buy them, they’re going to be tracked all the way from purchase to installation. If they’re set up one way, they’ll produce uranium that’s good enough for reactors, and that’s fine. If they’re set up another way, they’ll produce weapons-grade material, and that’s not. Changing from one configuration to the other will take a long time, so you can’t really switch them on inspection day. Finally, the Manhattan Project used a significant portion (I’ve heard as much as 10%) of the power generated in the entire Untied States at the time. That’s a LOT of power. Experts can make a pretty good estimate of your country’s power use, and power production, and if those numbers don’t match, they’ll know something’s up. Satellites will then look for unexplained power lines and heat sources, and inspectors will want to have a look at those places.
Plutonium production is harder to hide, because your reactors are either set up to make plutonium, or they aren’t. If they are, you’re almost certainly making it for weapons, because it has almost no other practical use.
Enrichment facilities are huge, they use very specialized equipment, and they consume a lot of power. Inspectors use all three of those factors to figure out when a country might be trying to hide weapon production.
First, if you build a factory big enough to house a uranium processing plant, a bunch of satellites are going to see it, so inspectors are going to want to look at it. Second, you’re going to have to buy some really big, really strong gas centrifuges, and those are only really used for one thing. Only a few companies make them, and while it’s fine for a country to buy them, they’re going to be tracked all the way from purchase to installation. If they’re set up one way, they’ll produce uranium that’s good enough for reactors, and that’s fine. If they’re set up another way, they’ll produce weapons-grade material, and that’s not. Changing from one configuration to the other will take a long time, so you can’t really switch them on inspection day. Finally, the Manhattan Project used a significant portion (I’ve heard as much as 10%) of the power generated in the entire Untied States at the time. That’s a LOT of power. Experts can make a pretty good estimate of your country’s power use, and power production, and if those numbers don’t match, they’ll know something’s up. Satellites will then look for unexplained power lines and heat sources, and inspectors will want to have a look at those places.
Plutonium production is harder to hide, because your reactors are either set up to make plutonium, or they aren’t. If they are, you’re almost certainly making it for weapons, because it has almost no other practical use.
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