In the simplest possible terms: aircraft (and every single component used in their manufacture) are designed to a certain set of rigorous standards.
Those standards require that the chance of any type of failure happening must be below a certain threshold (this is proven by testing every part of the design both as an individual unit and after being integrated into the system)
The degree of testing required for any component or device to be used on an aircraft is huge. It is very difficult to understand without experiencing the industry yourself.
If the result of a component failing is an event that causes a hazard to the aircraft or occupants then it will have at least one redundancy.
If the total chance of any failure or combination of failures that may cause loss of life is above a certain threshold (Think 1 in a billion per flight hour, that’s not an exaggeration) then additional redundancy is required until the chance of dying in a fiery crash is below the acceptable level.
The chance of these failures is a known quantity and there are millions of very smart people (and also me apparently) who have been paid to prove that each tiny individual component (down to single lines of code) of this massive machine is reliable enough to meet the lofty standards set by commercial aviation.
Then more people are paid to critically review the work done (with extreme prejudice) to ensure it is correct.
The process of designing and maintaining commercial airliners is incredibly thorough. That’s why it’s the safest way to travel (per mile at least).
* assurances about safety are null and void when management overrides engineers in matters of safety.
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