Eli5 why are combat units “ineffective” after taking 15% losses?
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There’s actually perfectly good historic examples of this as well as current ones in Russia. I mean, I can’t vouch for the numbers in Russia because Ukraine says different to the US who says different to the UK who says different to Poland who all completely disagree with Russia who must be kidding themselves to believe they lost on 500+ on the battlefield and not more like 5/10k plus.
So I will stick with the historical. There’s prime examples in Stalingrad whereby Paulus was unable to continue his offensives in and around the city to secure both his flanks and the city proper simply because he was plugging gaps with support units. When Von Richthofen of the Luftwaffe began to rant and rave about why Paulus was not exploiting the attacks his pilots were making by perpetually bombing Soviet positions, he replied he needed more men.
Von Richthofen pointed to the map and stated that he had a division that consisted of 12,000 men and we know as well that around 300,000 men were trapped in the pocket once operation Uranus succeeded. That sounds like a lot. But that is what is regarded as “Ration” strength, this is logistically the members living who need to be fed. Yes 12,000 men were alive and required feeding. But Paulus was logically only able field say, 140 give or take men into combat. The remainder were clerks, support units, officers, and the wounded who would still be counted under “ration” strength.
So yes 300,000+ were trapped in the cauldron after Uranus… But probably only about 10k of them were even suitable to engage in combat
The ten of you are excited to go get the enemy. Then you watch one of your squad mates literally explode. How excited are the other nine of you now?
I wish there were some Vietnam vets here to answer this question.
However let me try to make it very simple.
https://images.app.goo.gl/CatxTvjAjQavR5CE8
The problem is that 1 mans responsibilities are not exactly shared. It’s multiplied. One man less for watch which means someone isn’t getting their 4 hours of sleep, one man less to clear rooms, to pull rear security, to throw frags, to run ammo, to be able to help a buddy that’s been wounded. To help the .50 gunner in the turret, to pull guys out of wreckage, to scan for threats, over time that 1 man (16% of a 6 man squad) equates to 16% more work for the other 5. Do that under extremely stressful conditions for 12-14hours a day, where oopsies cost lives and body parts.
Not to mention if it’s a radio operator, or God forbid your forward observer that we rely on way too much anymore (imo) and you now can multiply that 16% by 3 or 4. The FO. Brings with him the wrath of God it seems. And he can’t do that without a radio.
Military Officer here:
Combat units are structured in such a way that the entire command structure can be supported on the backup’s backup taking over in the event that the primary leader is killed. For instance, in a squad made up of two fire teams (just as an example, there can be more) Each fire team has a designated leader in charge of moment-moment tactical decisions. However, there is also a central leader designated to be in charge of the entire squad. These positions are generally held by NCOs. In the event that the squad leader is killed, doctrine may dictate that the leader of fire team 2 becomes the new leader for the entire squad. This a simplified view for demonstration.
Combat units can only take so many of these losses before tactical (Tactical being the lowest OPCON level) control is lost. The role of officers (especially FGOs) is operational level bigger picture decision making. But none of these decisions are effective without front line leaders being able to translate command decision into actions.
The long and short of it is that 15% losses entails a level of loss contrary to total control of combat forces and drastically reduces the ability of any individual unit to purposefully complete objectives and to respond to changes in the battlefield.
These are just rules of thumb for Operational Risk Planning purposes. Some units have acceptable planned casualty rates as high as 30% (which is just fucking awesome when you’re in one of those).
Why is my car no longer effective after 15% of the parts fall off? /s
Think of a combat unit like an IKEA table – how many parts would you have to lose before you could no longer build a functioning table? The table designers have to balance the cost of the table with the redundancy of individual parts. It doesn’t matter how many extra bolts you have if your table leg gets broken in shipping – you have to take it back and get a new one to have a fully functioning table! (Alternatively, you can duct tape it together… but it won’t ever work as well!)
Losses don’t always mean killed soldiers.
If they are incapacitated, you will need to move them out or set up a strong position to take care of them.
That means that your 15% just grew to 30% of non-combatants.
This is a severe blow to the firepower your unit has, and then it is better to dig-in and wait for reinforcement or get out of the danger zone.
It takes two people to take care of a casualty. Your 15% losses require another 30% to treat them. You’re now down 45% of your force and losing any additional forces will require even more to take care of them bringing you to under 50%.
Theodore Ayrault Dodge did an analysis on battle casualty percentages from antiquity through the Civil War and he found that for most battles (that didn’t end in one-sided routs, or outliers. He also died before WW1.) the forces suffered between 10-15% losses on average, regardless of era or types of weapon used. I’m not really sure the takeaway from that, but it was really interesting.
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