Only particular example I have: in a recent budget override attempt in Alaska’s state gov 22 representatives didn’t show up to vote in support of the veto override
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So lawmakers have several things that motivate their actions (like enacting legislation that has policy they like, increasing their individual power, and so on). Of all the motivations that lawmakers have, being reelected is considered the strongest of a lawmakers motivation (this argument has strong evidence in political science but some scholars disagree). So lets apply this logic to the lawmakers in Alaska, 22 representatives did not show up for the veto override vote. These 22 representatives were also supportive of the governors veto. Right now the blame for the budget cuts will fall on the governor. If these 22 showed up and voted yes (for a veto override) they likely would have faced a strong challenge in a primary election. People who vote in primaries tend to have less moderate political views, thus the representatives would be blamed for not supporting the governor and political party. So those 22 representatives had a relatively high likelihood of losing in a primary challenge. Say these 22 representatives showed up and voted no to the veto override, then they would share responsibility for the veto. This veto has a considerable likelihood of becoming generally unpopular. Voting yes means that they would likely survive a primary challenge but they would then face a high chance of losing in a general election. So in conclusion, if they vote for the override they might lose in a primary election, if they vote no they might lose in a general election. If they don’t show up at all they can deflect blame to be on the governor. Not voting is the best option these representative have in addition to whatever quorum busting there might be.
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